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Abstract: The paper purports to examine the consequences of foreign direct investment
(FDI) in agricultural land in a developing economy using a three-sector general
equilibrium model with simultaneous existence off unemployment of both skilled and
unskilled labour. The analysis finds that FDI in agriculture does not only improve
national welfare unequivocally but also mitigates unemployment problem of both types
of labour. The paper theoretically justifies the desirability of flow of FDI in agriculture in
the developing economies.
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1. Introduction
Over the last decade the flow of FDI in agricultural land has gone up significantly in
some of the developing countries, especially those in the Sub-Saharan Africa and South
America. As per FAO (2009) the inflow of FDI into agriculture amounted to more than
USD 3 billion per year by 2007, compared to USD 1 billion in 2000. The main form of
recent investments is purchase or long-term leasing of agricultural land for food
production. The area of land acquired in Africa by foreign capitalists in the last three
years is estimated at up to 20 million hectares. This has led to a serious controversy
among trade and development economists, politicians, social workers and policymakers.
It is held that FDI in agricultural land is unethical as it violates property rights, denies
access to land and water and threatens food security, poverty reduction and rural
development in the capital host countries.
As per the conventional theoretical literature on international trade inflows of foreign
capital with full repatriation of foreign capital income and in the presence of tariff
protection of the capital-intensive import-competing sector is immiserizing. This
literature includes works of Brecher and Alejandro (1977), Khan (1982), Beladi and
Marjit (1992a, 1992b), Chandra and Khan (1993) etc. However, despite this welfare-
worsening effect of foreign capital the developing countries have been able to attract a
substantial amount of foreign capital1 during the last two decades by adopting liberalized
1 As per the UNCTAD (2008), the average yearly foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to
developing countries increased from nearly $20.6 billion during 1980s to $118 billion during
1990s and then 292 billion dollars per year, on an average, during the first eight years of the new
millennium. Average yearly net FDI flows to developing countries increased from nearly $14.7
billion during 80s to 165 billion dollars per year, on an average, during 2000-2008 (calculation
based on UNCTAD ‘Statistical Databases On-line’ and World Investment Report (2008)). FDI
inward stock in the developing countries has increased manifold from $302.6 billion in 1980 to
$4246.7 billion in 2007. Besides, for the developing countries as a whole, FDI inflow accounts
for nearly 13 percent of gross fixed capital formation in 2007, compared to less than 2 percent in
1980.
3investment and trade policies. Why developing countries are yearning for foreign capital
given the standard welfare deteriorating effects of foreign capital has been explained in
the works like Marjit and Beladi (1996), Chaudhuri (2005, 2007) and Chaudhuri et al.
(2006) which have demonstrated how foreign capital might produce favourable effects on
welfare taking into consideration some essential features of the developing economies
e.g. labour market distortion, presence of the vast informal economy and non-traded
goods..
On the other hand, the persistence of unemployment of labour has still been a major
problem in the developing world. The explanation of unemployment as a general
equilibrium phenomenon depends on the type of labour under consideration. The Harris-
Todaro (HT hereafter) (1970) type of model is one way to explain unemployment in a
general equilibrium framework. However, in such a model unemployment is specific to
the urban sector and is suitable to explain unemployment of unskilled labour only. But it
does not account for unemployment of skilled labour which is a disquieting problem in
the developing economies particularly after the global economic slowdown. The NSSO
61st Round report, Employment and Unemployment Situation in India 2004-05 has found
that the unemployment rate among those educated above the secondary level was higher,
in both rural and urban areas of India than those with lesser educational attainments.
Serneels (2007) has reported similar finding in the case of Ethiopia.
In order to theoretically explain the existence of unemployment of skilled labour, one has
to recourse to the efficiency wage theories. A generalized version of efficiency wage
theory is the ‘fair wage hypothesis’ (FWH). Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995), Feher
(1991), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), etc. have explained unemployment as a general
equilibrium phenomenon using the FWH. According to the treatment of the FWH by
Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995), efficiency of a worker is sensitive to the functional
distribution of income. Consequently, the return on capital and wage rates of labour and
the unemployment rate appear as arguments in the efficiency function.
4The objectives of the present paper are as follows. First, as the developing economies are
plagued by both skilled and unskilled unemployment2 it is important to develop an
analytical framework that can be useful in analyzing the consequences of different
policies on the national welfare and unemployment of both types of labour.3 We develop
a three-sector, specific-factor Harris-Todaro type general equilibrium model where the
FWH is valid. Second, we intend to examine the consequences of capital inflows on the
unemployment problem of both types labour. Finally and most importantly, we want to
show that flow of FDI in agricultural land unequivocally improves social welfare.
Moreover, FDI in agriculture also mitigates the unemployment problem of either type of
labour. On the contrary, foreign capital inflows into the secondary sectors may be
immiserizing. Although many of the developing economies4 are yet to go far in allowing
the entry of foreign capital into agriculture the analysis of the present paper justifies the
desirability of FDI flow in agriculture from the perspective of both unemployment and
social welfare.
2.  The Model
We consider a small open dual economy with three sectors: one rural and two urban.
There are four factors of production: land, capital, unskilled labour and skilled labour.
The rural sector produces an agricultural commodity using land, capital and unskilled
labour. The production technology in agriculture is of the fixed-coefficient type.5
2
 See NSSO (2006) and Agenor (2004) among others.
3 This is essential, especially when the unemployment situation of either type of labour has
worsened alarmingly due to recent global financial and economic crisis. See ILO (2009),
Alexander (2009) etc. in this context.
4 For example, in India, FDI in agriculture is only permitted in certain sectors like floriculture,
horticulture, development of seeds, animal husbandry, pisiculture, and cultivation of vegetables.
Besides, FDI is permitted in tea plantations subject to the Foreign Investment Promotion Board
(FIPB) approval. Details are available at http://business.mapsofindia.com/fdi-
india/sectors/agriculture-services.html.
5
 Although this is a simplifying assumption it is not completely without any basis. After the
advent of the new seed-fertilizer technology in many of the developing economies including India
51Na units of land ( N ), 1Ka units of capital ( K ) and 1La units of unskilled labour ( L )
together produce one unit of the agricultural output ( 1X ) . Sector 2 is an urban sector that
produces a low-skill manufacturing commodity ( 2X ) by means of capital and unskilled
labour. Finally, sector 3, another urban sector, uses capital and skilled labour ( S ) to
produce a high-skill commodity ( 3X ).
Skilled labour is specific to sector 3. Unskilled labour is imperfectly mobile between
sectors 1 and 2 while capital is completely mobile among all the three sectors of the
economy. On the other hand, as sectors 2 and 3 produce non-agricultural commodities
land is specific to the rural sector (sector 1). Although the amount of agricultural land of
the economy is given, the effective land endowment can be increased by allowing the
entry of foreign capital in agriculture. Foreign investments may be sought to exploit
“surplus” land currently unused or underutilized.6 One reason land may not be used to its
full potential is that the infrastructural investments needed to bring it into production are
so significant as to be beyond the budgetary resources of the country. International
investments might bring much needed infrastructural investments which in turn could
relax the land constraint of the economy. Hence the aggregate land endowment of the
economy ( N ) consists of both domestically-owned ( DN ) and foreign-owned ( FN ) land
and is an increasing function of the amount of FDI in agriculture ( I ).
Sector 2 faces an imperfect unskilled labour market in the form of a unionized labour
market where unskilled workers receive a contractual wage, *W , while the unskilled
during the 1960s, agriculture requires inputs which are to be used in recommended doses. The
inherent complementarity among the different inputs may justify the use of the fixed-coefficient
production technology in agriculture.  There are several works including those of Ensminger
(2002) and FAO (2003) that have documented the critical role played by the use of various
complementary agricultural inputs including land, fertilizer, hybrid seeds, and agricultural labour
in enhancing agricultural output in many developing countries. However, even if the inputs are
substitutes, the results of the paper still hold under additional sufficient conditions incorporating
the partial elasticities of substitution between the three inputs.
6
 See FAO (2009).
6wage rate in the rural sector, ,W is market determined. The two unskilled wage rates are
related by the Harris-Todaro (1970) migration equilibrium condition where the expected
urban wage equals the rural wage rate with .* WW  Therefore, there is urban
unemployment of unskilled labour. On the other hand, we use the FWH to explain
unemployment of skilled labour and the efficiency function is similar to that in Agell and
Lundborg (1992, 1995).  This function can be derived from the effort norm of the skilled
workers, which is sensitive to the functional distribution of income and the skilled
unemployment rate. This is the optimal effort function of the utility maximizing skilled
workers. The aggregate capital stock of the economy ( K ) includes both domestic capital
( DK ) and foreign capital ( FK ) and these are perfect substitutes. Incomes from foreign
capital and foreign-owned land are completely repatriated. Sectors 1 and 3 are the two
export sectors while sector 2 is the import-competing sector and is protected by an import
tariff.  Sector 2 uses capital more intensively with respect to unskilled labour vis-à-vis
sector 1. Production functions in the two non-agricultural sectors are of the variable-
coefficient type and exhibit constant returns to scale with positive and diminishing
marginal productivity to each factor. Finally, commodity 3 is chosen as the numeraire.
The following additional symbols will be used for formal presentation of the model.
Kia   amount of capital required to produce 1 unit of output in the ith sector, i  1,2,3;
Lia unskilled labour-output ratio in the ith sector, i  1,2;
3Sa  skilled labour-output ratio in sector 3 (in efficiency unit);
iP exogenously given relative price of the i th commodity, i  = 1,2;
t  ad-valorem rate of tariff on the import of commodity 2;
E  efficiency of each skilled worker;
SW wage rate of skilled labour;
SW
E
 wage rate per efficiency unit of skilled labour;
r  return to capital (both domestic and foreign);
R   return to land (both domestically-owned and foreign-owned);
L  endowment of unskilled labour (in physical unit);
7S  endowment of skilled labour (in physical unit);
v  unemployment rate of skilled labour;
UL = urban unemployment of unskilled labour;
ji distributive share of the j th input in the i th sector for j ,N , ,L S K  and i  1, 2,
3;
ji proportion of the j th input employed in the i th sector for j KL, and i 1,2,3;
 '' proportionate change.
Given the perfectly competitive commodity markets, the three price-unit cost equality
conditions relating to the three industries are as follows.
1 1 1 1L K NWa ra Ra P   (1)
*
2 2 2 (1 )L KW a ra P t   (2)
3 3 1S S K
W
a ra
E
  (3)
Following Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995) we assume that the effort norms of the
skilled labour depend positively on (i) skilled wage relative to average unskilled wage;
(ii) skilled wage relative to returns on capital and land; and, positively on (iii) the
unemployment rate of skilled labour. It may be mentioned that the average unskilled
wage in the economy is the rural sector wage that follows from the ‘envelope property’ of
the HT framework.7 Therefore, we write
( , , , )S S SW W WE E v
W r R
 (4)
7 Unskilled workers are employed in the rural and low-skill urban manufacturing sectors where
they earn W and *W wages, respectively. Some of the unskilled workers remain unemployed in
the urban sector earning nothing. The average wage income of all unskilled workers in the
economy is the rural sector wage. This can be easily shown from equations (10) and (11). So, the
efficiency function, given by equation (4), indirectly takes into account the unionized wage and
the urban unemployment of unskilled labour as determinants.
8The efficiency function satisfies the following mathematical restrictions:
1 2 3 4, , , 0E E E E  ; 11 22 33, , 0E E E  ; 12 13 14 23 24 34 0E E E E E E      .⁭8
The unit cost of skilled labour in sector 3, denoted by  , is given as
( )(.)
SW
E
  (5)
Each firm in sector 3 minimizes its unit cost of skilled labour as given by (5). The first-
order condition of minimization is
1 2 3
S S SW W WE E E E
W r R
   (6)
where: iE s are the partial derivatives of the efficiency function with respect to
( )SW
W
, ( )SW
r
and ( )SW
R
, respectively. Equation (6) can be rewritten as
1 2 3 1     (6.1)
where i is the elasticity of the (.)E function with respect to its i th argument. This is the
modified Solow condition as obtained in Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995).
The amount of foreign-owned ( FN ) land is considered to be an increasing function of the
amount of FDI in agriculture ( I ) i.e.
( ); 0F F FN N I N   .
Full utilization of land9 and capital, respectively entail
1 1 ( )N D Fa X N N I N   (7)
8
 Mathematical derivation of the efficiency function from the rational behavior of a representative
skilled worker and explanations of the mathematical restrictions on the partial derivatives are
available in Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995).
9
 Note that the aggregate land endowment of the economy ( N ) is an increasing function of the
amount of FDI in agriculture ( I ).
91 1 2 2 3 3K K Ka X a X a X K   (8)
There is unemployment of skilled labour in the economy and the rate of unemployment is
.v  The skilled labour endowment equation is, therefore, given by
3 3 (1 )Sa X E v S   (9)
In the migration equilibrium there exists urban unemployment of unskilled labour. The
unskilled labour endowment equation is given by
1 1 2 2L L Ua X a X L L   (10)
In a Harris-Todaro framework the unskilled labour allocation mechanism is such that in
the labor market equilibrium, the rural wage rate, ,W equals the expected wage income in
the urban sector. Since the probability of finding a job in the urban low-skill sector is
2 2 2 2( / ( ))L L Ua X a X L the expected unskilled wage in the urban sector is
2 2 2 2( * / ( ))L L UW a X a X L . Therefore, the rural-urban migration equilibrium condition of
unskilled labour is expressed as
2 2 2 2( * / ( ))L L UW a X a X L W  ,
or equivalently,
2 2 1 1( * / ) L LW W a X a X L   (11)
Using (7) and (9) equations (11) and (8) can be rewritten as follows.
*
1
2 2
1
( ) LL
N
aW
a X N L
W a
  ; and, (11.1)
31
2 2
1 3
(1 )[( ) { }]KK K
N S
a E v Sa N a X K
a a
   (8.1)
In this general equilibrium model there are ten endogenous variables; namely, , , ,W r R
1 2, , , , ,S UW E v L X X and 3X and the same number of independent equations; namely, (1) –
(4), (6), (7), (8.1), (9), (10) and (11.1). The endogenous variables are determined as
10
follows. The system does not possess the decomposition property. r is found from (2)
as *W is given exogenously. , , ,SW R W v and 2X are simultaneously solved from equations
(1), (4), (6), (8.1) and (11.1). E is then found from (3). 1X and 3X are solved from
equations (7) and (9), respectively. Finally, UL is obtained from (10).
A close look at the price system reveals that given the value of R , sectors 1 and 2 can be
conceived to form a Heckscher-Ohlin subsystem (HOSS) as they use two common
inputs: unskilled labour and capital. It is sensible to assume that sector 2 is more capital-
intensive than sector 1 in value sense with respect to unskilled labour. This implies that
2 2 1 1( / * ) ( / )K L K La W a a Wa .
We measure welfare of the economy by national income at world prices, Y , and is given
by
2 2(1 )D D SY WL RN rK W v S tP X           (12)
It is assumed that incomes from foreign capital and foreign-owned land are completely
repatriated. In equation (12), WL  and (1 )SW v S give the aggregate wage incomes of the
unskilled and skilled workers, respectively. DRN is the rental income from domestically-
owned land endowment10 while DrK denotes rental income from domestic capital.
Finally, 22 XtP measures the supply side distortionary cost of tariff protection of the
import-competing sector.
3. Comparative Statics
We are now going to analyze the consequences of inflows of foreign capital on national
welfare and unemployment of both skilled and unskilled labour. An inflow of foreign
10 If a part of the FDI in agriculture takes the form of long-term rental contracts of existing land
by foreign capitalists the amount of domestically-owned land ( DN ) falls but the aggregate rental
income (including that from leased out land) does not fall if the leasing out of land takes place at
the market determined rental rate, R . On the contrary, DN does not change if the FDI is made to
exploit “surplus” land currently unused or underutilized.
11
capital into the primary export sector is captured by an increase in I which in turn raises
the aggregate endowment of land of the economy. On the other hand, an FDI in the
secondary sectors including the tariff-protected import-competing sector of the economy
is demonstrated through an increase in the endowment of K.⁭11
Differentiating equations (1), (4) (6), (11.1) and (8.1) the following expressions are
derived, respectively.12
1 1
ˆ ˆ 0L NW R   (13)
1 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0W R v     (14)
1 2 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0SBW B R B W v    (15)
* *
2 2 2 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ
L LW X M I     (16)
2 2 3 4 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆK K SX W B v K M I     (17)
where:
211
1 ( ) 0S
WEB
E W
   ; 2332 ( ) 0SE WB E R  ;
2 2 2 3311 22
3 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0S S S
W W W EE EB
W E r E R E
       ;
3
4 ( ) 01
K vB
v
  ; (18)
*
2 2
*(( )( )) 0; ( ) 0; ( ) 0;F FL L NF
F
dN NI W
e
dI N W N
       
1 1 2 10; 0.L NF K NFM e M e      
Arranging (13) – (17) in a matrix notation one obtains
11
 Although over the last two decades the investment policy has significantly been liberalized in
the developing economies like India, there still exists a considerable degree of restriction in the
process of free inflow of foreign capital into these countries. For example, in India, barring some
sectors kept under the automatic route foreign investors are required to secure prior permissions
or approvals from the Government of India or the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), or the FIPB for
the purpose of making investment. There are also sectoral caps in many sectors limiting the
maximum levels of foreign investment that can be made in those sectors. Besides, capital is not
permitted to move freely from one approved FDI project to another.
12
 Note that 1La , 1Na and 1Ka are technologically given. See footnote 5 in this context.
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1 1
1 3 4
1 2 3 4
* *
2 2 1
3 4 2 22
ˆ 00 0 0
ˆ 00 0
0ˆ0
ˆ0 0 0 ˆ
ˆ ˆ0 0 ˆ
L N
S
L L
K K
W
R
B B B W
M Iv
B K M IX
 
  

 
 
                                         
(19)
The determinant to the coefficient matrix is
*
2 4 3 1 2 4 3 3 4[ ( )]L N K KD B J B B H         (20)
(+)(-)               (+) (-)(+)
where
1 2 3 1 1 1{ ( ) ( )}L NJ B B       ;
1 3 1 1( )L NH      . (21)
As the production structure is indecomposable an increase in the land endowment of the
economy that results from an increase in foreign investments in agriculture ( I ) must
lower its rate of return, R i.e. ˆ ˆ( / ) 0R N  . Thus, solving (19) by Cramer’s rule it can be
easily proved13 that
0D  (22)
For determining the signs of J and H we need to impose some restrictions on the relative
responsiveness of the (.)E , 1E and 3E functions with respect to their two arguments:
( )SW
W
and ( )SW
R
. The efficiency function, given by equation (4), is assumed to satisfy the
following two special properties.
Property A: The responsiveness of (.)E with respect to SW
R
is greater than that with
respect to SW
W
 such that 3 1
1 1
( ) ( )
N L
 
  .
13
 This has been shown in Appendix I.
13
Property B: The algebraic value of the elasticity of 3E  with respect to S
W
R
is not less
than that of 1E  with respect to S
W
W
i.e. 33 11
3 1
( ) ( ).S SE W E W
E R E W

The implications of the above two properties are as follows. Although the efficiency of
skilled workers depends on the relative income distribution, they are expected to have
different attitudes towards the earnings of different factors of production. So changes in
incomes of different factors should affect the efficiency of skilled labour in different
degrees. It is reasonable to assume that the average unskilled wage is substantially lower
than the skilled wage so that the skilled workers may be expected to be compassionate
towards their unskilled counterparts. On the contrary, they are likely to feel significantly
deprived if the returns on land and capital increase relative to the skilled wage, adversely
affecting their work morale. Therefore, it may be logical, to assume that increases in
incomes of the capitalists engender more negative response among the skilled workers
and lower their efficiency than that resulting from an increase in the average unskilled
wage.
Properties (A) and (B) of the efficiency function together imply that14
1 1 1 1
1 3 3 2
( ) ( ) ( );  and,L
N
B
B
  
  
   (23)
1 2 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 1{ ( ) ( )} 0; ( ) 0L N L NJ B B H              
Differentiating (2) and (3) it is easy to show that
ˆ ˆ
SE W (24)
This leads to the following corollary.
14 This has been proved in Appendix II.
14
Corollary 1: The efficiency of skilled labour, E , and the skilled wage rate, SW , always
change in the same direction and in the same proportion.
From (13) we can write
1
1
ˆ ˆ( )N
L
W R  (25)
This establishes the following corollary.
Corollary 2: W and R are negatively correlated.
Using (25) equation (14) can be rewritten as follows.
3 1 1 1
4 1
ˆ( )ˆ L N
L
R
v
   
 
 (26)
Using (23) from (26) the following corollary is imminent.
Corollary 3: R and v are positively related.15
Adding (14) and (15) and substituting for Wˆ from (13) we get
1 3 2 1 1 1
1 3
( ) ( )ˆ ˆ[ ]L NS
L
B BW R
B
   

   (27)
                              (–)
With the help of (23) from (27) the following corollary immediately follows.
Corollary 4: R and SW are negatively related.
Solving (19) by Cramer’s rule the following proposition can be easily established.16
Proposition 1: Under assumptions A and B, an inflow of foreign capital to either of the
two broad sectors of the economy leads to (i) an increase in the rural unskilled wage
(W ); (ii) a decrease in the return to land ( R ); (iii) an increase in the skilled wage
( SW );.(iv) a fall in the unemployment rate of skilled labour ( v ); and, (v) an expansion of
sector 3. Furthermore, (vi) sector 1 expands (remains unaffected) while sector 2 contracts
15 As the rural sector unskilled wage and the return on land are negatively related (corollary 2)
there is a negative relationship between the average (rural) unskilled wage and skilled
unemployment rate.
16
 See Appendix III for mathematical derivations of the results.
15
(expands) owing to inflows of foreign capital into the primary (secondary) sector of the
economy.
An inflow of foreign capital in agriculture ( I ) raises the effective land endowment of the
economy thereby lowering its return ( R ). This raises the rural unskilled wage,W in order
to satisfy the zero-profit condition in sector 1 (see equation (1)). A fall in R lowers the
skilled unemployment rate, v (corollary 3) and raises the skilled wage, SW (corollary 4)
and hence their efficiency, E (corollary 1). As employment of skilled labour rises in
efficiency unit (also in physical unit) sector 3 expands. Sector 1 also expands as the
endowment of the sector-specific input, land, has increased. Both sector 1 and sector 3
draw capital from sector 2 leading to a contraction of the latter.
On the other hand, an inflow of foreign capital in the non-agricultural sectors does not
affect its return, r , since it is determined from equation (2). Both sector 2 and sector 3
expand as they use capital. The output and the employment in sector 1 do not change
because the endowment of the sector-specific input, land does not change and the
production technology is of the fixed-coefficient type. As sector 2 expands the expected
urban unskilled wage for a prospective rural unskilled worker rises. This lures the rural
workers to move into the urban sector. But as the output and the employment in
agriculture do not change the workers can be kept in the rural sector only if the rural
sector unskilled wage (W ) rises sufficiently. An increase inW lowers the return to land
( R ) which in turn raises SW (corollary 4) and hence E (corollary 1) and lowers the
skilled unemployment rate, v (corollary 3). As the employment of skilled labour rises in
both efficiency and physical units, sector 3 expands.
We now intend to examine the welfare consequences of FDI flows into the different
sectors of the economy. Differentiating the national income expression (equation 12) the
following proposition can be proved.17
17 This has been proved in Appendix IV.
16
Proposition 2: An inflow of foreign capital in agriculture is unambiguously welfare-
improving18 while inflows of foreign capital in the secondary sectors may fail to boost
social welfare.
We explain proposition 2 in the following fashion. In proposition 1 we find that an inflow
of foreign capital to either of the two broad sectors of the economy raises the aggregate
unskilled wage, aggregate skilled employment and hence the aggregate skilled wage but
lowers the domestic rental income on land. The domestic capital income, however,
remains unchanged. It is easy to show that the increase in the aggregate unskilled wage
income outweighs the fall in domestic rental income on land.19 Hence in both the cases
the aggregate factor income unambiguously rises. Besides, an inflow of capital in
agriculture leads to a contraction of the tariff protected import-competing sector. Hence
the cost of protection of the import-competing sector falls. Social welfare unequivocally
improves in this case. But in the case of foreign capital inflow to the non-agricultural
sectors the protected sector expands. Hence there is no guarantee that it improves social
welfare unless the positive aggregate factor income effect is strong enough to dominate
over the negative supply side distortionary effect of tariff protection of the import-
competing sector.
Our next task is to analyze the outcomes of foreign capital inflows in different sectors on
the unemployment of unskilled labour in the urban area. Subtraction of equation (10)
from (11) yields
2 2
*( )U L
W WL a X
W
 (28)
18
 Here foreign capital inflow takes place into the economy’s primary export sector. There are
other papers in the literature like Beladi and Marjit (1992) that have examined the welfare
consequence of foreign capital into the export sector of a small open economy. However, they
have found the inflow of foreign capital to be immiserizing.
19
 This has been shown in Appendix IV.
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Totally differentiating equation (28) one can establish the final proposition of the
model.20
Proposition 3: An inflow of foreign capital to either of the two broad sectors of the
economy unambiguously improves the urban unemployment problem of unskilled labour.
We explain proposition 3 in the following manner. In the migration equilibrium the
expected urban wage for a prospective unskilled rural migrant equals the actual unskilled
rural wage. An inflow of foreign capital of either type affects the migration equilibrium
in two ways. First, the low-skill urban manufacturing sector expands or contracts. This
leads to a change in the number of jobs available in this sector. The expected urban wage
for a prospective rural migrant, 2 2[ * /{1 ( / )}],U LW L a X changes as the probability of
getting a job in this sector changes for every unskilled worker. This is the centrifugal
force. If the expected urban wage rises (falls) the centrifugal force is positive
(negative).This paves the way for fresh migration (reverse migration) from the rural
(urban) to the urban (rural) sector. On the other hand, an inflow of foreign capital of
either type raises the rural unskilled wage (see proposition 1). This is the centripetal force
that prevents rural workers from migrating into the urban sector. Thus, there are two
opposite effects that determine the size of the unemployed urban unskilled workforce. In
the case of an inflow of foreign capital in agriculture the low-skill urban manufacturing
sector contracts both in terms of output and employment. The expected urban unskilled
wage falls. So the centrifugal force is negative and drives the unemployed urban workers
to return to the rural sector. Thus, both the negative centripetal force and the centrifugal
force work in the same direction and cause the urban unemployment of unskilled labour
to decline. On the contrary, in the case of an inflow of foreign capital in the secondary
sectors the low-skill urban sector expands and raises the expected urban unskilled wage.
This lures the rural workers to move into the urban sector. But as the rural sector output
and employment do not change the workers can be kept in the rural sector only if the
rural sector unskilled wage rises sufficiently. Given that the employment of unskilled
labour in agriculture does not change and that the employment in the low-skill urban
20 See Appendix V for mathematical proof of this proposition.
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sector (sector 2) has increased, the aggregate employment of unskilled labour in the
economy increases thereby improving the urban unemployment problem.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper has developed a three-sector general equilibrium model that can explain the
unemployment phenomenon of both skilled and unskilled labour. The unemployment of
unskilled labour is explained in terms of the Harris-Todaro (1970) type rural-urban
migration mechanism while that of skilled labour is shown using the FWH. There are
four factors of production: land, capital, unskilled labour and skilled labour. The land
endowment of the economy can be increased by allowing the entry of foreign capital in
agriculture. Inflows of foreign capital may take place also in the secondary sectors of the
economy. Consequences of foreign capital inflows in different sectors of the economy
have been studied on national welfare and unemployment of either type of labour. The
most important finding of the paper is that flow of FDI in agriculture unambiguously
improves social welfare. Furthermore, it lowers the magnitude of unemployment problem
of each type of labour. On the contrary, an inflow of foreign capital into the secondary
sectors may affect social welfare adversely. The paper, therefore, justifies the desirability
of FDI flow in agricultural land in the developing world from the viewpoint of both
unemployment and social welfare. These results shed some new light on a long-standing
policy debate as to whether priority should be given to agriculture or to secondary or
services sector for achieving a decent economic growth and eradicating poverty in a
developing economy. Montalvo and Ravallion (2009) have discussed this issue in details
by citing both the Chinese and the Indian experiences. Although India could achieve a
high rate of economic growth during the liberalized regime giving high priority to the
tertiary sector she has not performed well on the poverty front.21 On the contrary, China
has been amply successful in both economic growth and poverty fronts by giving top
21 The World Bank (2008) estimates that 456 million Indians (42% of the total Indian population)
in 2005 lived under the global poverty line of $1.25 per day (Purchasing power parity). This
means that a third of the global poor in 2005 lived in India. Besides, the number of poor people
living under $1.25 a day has increased from 421 million in 1981 to 456 million in 2005. Further
details are available at http://go.worldbank.org/DQKD6WV4T0
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priority to agriculture. After witnessing China’s exemplary success on the agricultural
front the developing economies like India are of late toying with the idea of permitting
foreign investment in agriculture.22, 23, 24 The analysis of the paper provides a theoretical
foundation of such a move by the developing nations.
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Appendix I:
Solving (19) by Cramer’s rule the following result is obtained.
*
1 4 3
ˆ
( )ˆ L NF
R B e
DI
    (A.1)
                  (+)(–)
where:
*
2 4 3 1 2 4 3 3 4[ ( )]L N K KD B J B B H         (20)
(+)(-)               (+) (-)(+)
1 2 3 1 1 1{ ( ) ( )}L NJ B B       ;
1 3 1 1( )L NH      ; and, (A.2)
*
1 2 2 1
*( ) 0L K L K
W
W
      
(Note that * 0  as sector 1 is more unskilled labour-intensive vis-à-vis sector 2 in value
sense.)
In an indecomposable production structure like this it is sensible to assume that R falls
(rises) if I (hence N ) rises (falls) i.e.
ˆ
( ) 0ˆ
R
I
 . From (A.1) it then follows that
0D  (22)
From (20), (A.2) and (22) it follows that two sufficient conditions for 0D  are:
, 0J H  .
Appendix II:
As 1 3( ); ( ) 0
( ) ( )S S
E EE EW W
W R
   
 
and 11 33, 0E E  we must have
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2
1 11[ ( ) ] 0S
WE E
W
   ; and,
2
3 33[ ( ) ] 0S
WE E
R
   . Using (18) one can write
1 1( ) 0B   ; and, (A.3)
3 2( ) 0B   .
From Assumption A it follows that
1 1
1 3
( ) ( )L
N
 
  (A.4)
That 0H  is a direct consequence of Assumption A. We are going to prove that 0J  if
Assumption B holds.
From (23)
0J   1 1 1
1 3 2
( ) ( )L
N
B
B
 
 
  (A.5)
Now
1 2 3 11 1 1 1 2 1
3 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 1
( )( )[ ] [ ] ( )[ ]( ) ( )
B BB B B
B B B
   
      
     
Substituting the values of 1B and 2B from (18) and simplifying we can obtain the following
expression.
33 111 1 1 1
3 2 3 3 2 3 1
( )[ ] ( )[ ]( )
S SE W E WB
B B E R E W
  
  
    (A.6)
Now if 33 11
3 1
( ) ( )S SE W E W
E R E W
 i.e. if Assumption B holds from (A.3) and (A.6) it follows that
1 1 1
3 2 3
( )
( )
B
B
 
 
  (A.7)
From (A.4) and (A.7) we can write
1 1 1
1 3 2
( ) ( )L
N
B
B
 
 
  0J  .
Combining (A.4) and (A.7) and using (21) one can write
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1 1 1 1
1 3 3 2
( ) ( ) ( ) , 0.L
N
B J H
B
  
  
    (23)
Appendix III:
Solving (19) by Cramer’s rule, using (18), (22) and (23) and simplifying the following
results can be obtained.
*
4 1 3ˆ ( ) 0ˆ
N NFB eW
DI
      ;
*
4 1 3 2
ˆ
0ˆ
N LBW
DK
     ;
*
1 4 3
ˆ
( ) 0ˆ L NF
R B e
DI
     ;
*
2 1 4 3
ˆ ( ) 0ˆ
L L BR
DK
   
*
4
ˆ
0ˆ
S
NF
W J e
DI
    ;
*
2
4
ˆ
0ˆ
S LW J
DK
  
*
3
ˆ 0ˆ NF
v B H e
DI
   ;
*
2
3
ˆ 0ˆ
Lv B H
DK
                                                                      (A.8)
1
NF
ˆ
 e 0ˆ
X
I
  ;
1
ˆ
0ˆ
X
K
 ;
*
3 4 1 22
ˆ
( ) 0ˆ
N LBX
DK
    
*2
1 4 3 3 4 2 4 3 1 2
ˆ 1 [ ( ) ] 0ˆ K N L
X M J B B H M B
DI
        
Results presented in (A.8) have been verbally stated in proposition 1.
Appendix IV:
Totally differentiating (12), using (A.8), (18), (22) and (23) and simplifying the following
two expressions can be derived
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* *
4 3
1 1 4 3
ˆ
( ) ( ) {(1 ) }ˆ
NF S NF
N L D
B e W S eYY WL RN v J vB H
D DI
           
  (+)   (+)   (–)(+)
*2 2
1 3 4 4 3 2 4 3 1 2[ ( ) ]K N L
tP X M B B H J M B
D
       (A.9)
                (+)    (+)(–)(+)(+) (+) (+) (+)(+)(–)
and,
*4 3
1 1 2
ˆ
( ) ( )ˆ N L D L
BYY WL RN
DK
      *2 4 3{(1 ) }S LW S v J vB HD
   
                   (–)                                           (+)                 (+)   (–)(+)
*4 3
2 2 1 2( ) N L
B
tP X
D
   (A.10)
                                                                          (–)
Now
1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) 0DN L D N L
N
NWL RN W L a
a
      (A.11)
(as from (7) 1
1
D
N
N X
a
 ; and, DN N )
From equation (A.11) we find that the increase in the aggregate unskilled wage income
outweighs the fall in the domestic rental income on land.
Using (A.11) from (A.9) we can conclude that
ˆ
( ) 0ˆ
Y
I
 .
However the sign of
ˆ
( )ˆ
Y
K
is ambiguous which follows from (A.10).
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Appendix V:
Total differentials of equation (28) yield
* *
2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ[( ) ( ) ]LU U L
W W WL X W
W W
   
(A.12)
where ( )ULU
L
L
 
Using (A.8) and simplifying from (A.12) the following expressions can be derived.
*
2
1 3 4 3 4
ˆ
( ) ( )[[( )[ ( )ˆ
U L
K
LU
L W W M B B H J
D WI
  
  *2 4 3 1 2 ]N LM B  
                     (+) (+)(–)(+)(+)    (+)(+) (+)(+)(–)
*
*
1 4 3( )( ) ]] 0.N NF
W B e
W
    
(A.13)
(+)(–) (+) (+)
*
3 4 1 22
ˆ
( ) ( )[ ] 0.ˆ
U N LL
LU
L B
DK
  
  (A.14)
